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Inaction is sometimes the optimal path—a point well taken by economists. In her substantial volume on 
optimal control, economist Nancy Stokey begins: “In situations where action entails a fixed adjustment 
cost, optimal policies involve doing nothing most of the time and exercising control only occasionally.”1 
When fixed adjustment costs exist, the investment profile over time tends to be characterized by sudden 
shifts followed by periods of complete inaction, economists often refer to this as a “lumpy” investment 
profile. 
Much literature on information security focuses on how cybersecurity threats occur and how to best 
resolve them. However, additional factors, such as the risk environment, interdependent actors, attackers’ 
reuse of exploits, and patching vulnerabilities contribute to Chief Information Security Officers’ (CISOs’) 
defense strategies. Indeed, in many cases, the optimal decision is to wait until the degree of uncertainty 
changes and the benefits of action outweigh the costs.  
The defensive investment problem  
CISOs typically ask two questions: i) How do we measure our return on security investment?, and ii) How, 
on an empirical cost–benefit basis, do we know when to patch, fix, or shut down systems as and when new 
vulnerabilities arise? Both questions address optimal control problems in the presence of fixed adjustment 
costs. These costs might be known, or they may contain uncertain forward-looking components, and there 
is a tradeoff between these costs versus  uncertain future gains.  
It’s difficult to measure return on security investment. The constantly evolving state of the “market for 
attacks” increases the difficulty in determining a security investment’s true value. A firm’s senior corporate 
officer rarely knows empirically (for instance, by audit) whether the firm has had no known security 
incidents because the firm: 
 
 is spending exactly the right amount on security;  
 is spending many times more than it needs;  
 is spending too little, but attackers haven’t stumbled across its vulnerabilities or found it 
worthwhile to exploit them; or 
 is under attack but doesn’t know it. 
 
To determine a decisions optimal timing, much information is needed about the nature of  uncertain 
future outcomes, for example, a security manager might wait to see if an exploit will be available for a 
vulnerability. However, managing cybersecurity investment receives less quantitative support than other 
typical risk-management activities undertaken by a firm. For instance, most firms actively manage interest 
rate and foreign exchange risk through their treasury management functions. These activities are carefully 
accounted for in corporate reports alongside their normal operational activities. Booked losses on hedging 
can be very large, but senior corporate officers and investors generally understand that it’s important to 
hedge currency and interest rate risk, even if the specifics are hazy.  
On the other hand, many CISOs struggle to procure adequate budget until after a significant event has 
occurred. The decision to invest in a security fix or control appears to be increasingly well understood—for 
large technology companies at least. The decision process for the deployment of a patch is roughly as 
follows:  
  Determine the security flaw’s severity and level of impact on the organization (possibly using 
the US National Institute of Standards and Technology Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
calculator);  
 Determine the danger of implementing a patch and how much testing is required to ensure that 
the patch is less destructive than the threat; and  
 After weighing the first two steps, triage the update to either an immediate implementation or a 
regular update cycle. 
 
In a case study on optimal patching, Christos Ioannidis and his colleagues, amongst others, postulated a 
quantitative tradeoff between the increasing risk of doing nothing and the deterministic cost associated with 
potentially incomplete mitigation.2 Indeed, the patching problem is an archetypal fixed adjustment cost in a 
security setting; part of the objective of this paper is to provide a consistent treatment of this problem.  
 
So, instead of management’s failure to provide resources to underfunded information security departments 
being a catastrophic misstep, a delay in the implementation of security investment controls might be a 
sensible tradeoff between risk and investment. Many economic models suggest that the tactic of postponing 
updates might be gaining popularity—not because C-level employees are taking unreasonable risks, but 
because of an older, much more formidable foe: the tiny adjustments that drive us to the Nash equilibrium, 
wherein agents continually make choices as they strategize actions and respond to those of others. 
In security decision making, we can model the Nash equilibrium problem using three groups of agents: 
attackers, firms, and government. Attackers decide to invest in a malware or hacking effort, firms in 
defensive security and regulations, and government in enforcement. Their payoff structures will differ. For 
instance, hackers might value chaos over money, and firms and governments might value coverage in 
addition to a simple likelihood × impact calculation. Each will have their own subjective discount factors 
transforming future value of costs and benefits into risk adjusted current values; therefore, the relative 
present valuation of costs and benefits will be idiosyncratic across the various agents in the economy. 
The Attackers’ Economy  
Agents working as ‘attackers’ are economic actors with preferences—who are the attackers, and what do 
we know about them? Prior security investment literature typically views attackers as essentially random-
number generators.3 Generators consider a set of vulnerabilities in commonly used software, firmware, and 
hardware and then throw malicious agents at this set. Eventually, technical proficiency and vulnerability 
combine to create a tool that can threaten the economic and physical well-being of the selected targets.  
Looking at the relative scale of a threat versus the scale of investment to mitigate the threat, the 2015 
UN estimated that global annual gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated between $60 and $80 trillion 
in 2014.i Estimates for the size of the cyber security industry are somewhat difficult to ascertain, in 2014 
Gartner estimated that the cybersecurity industry accounts for approximately $77 billion—less than one-
tenth of 1 percent of global GDP compared to conventional security expenditure on defense equipment and 
physical security, which is approximately 4 percent of the GDP at just under $400 billion.ii 
On the other side of the attack-defense equation, in a study examining transactions in a Russian online 
hacker market (which Google and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation indicate accounts for a majority 
of online deployed malware tools), we found that transaction sizes are quite low, often in the hundreds of 
dollars, and only rarely in the tens of thousands.4 Although the underground hacker market appears to be a 
well-functioning economy, it is potentially, significantly smaller than the opposing security industry.  
Of course, the unit of account for losses might differ dramatically from the unit of account for rewards. 
If we look at insurance claims against cyber attacks from industry surveys, the claims from US firms are 
similarly very small; between 2011 and 2013, the median claim was $750,000 and the high was $13.5 
million. This individual claim represented approximately 10 percent of total claims made.5  
What do we take from this? The data on the insurance market and our understanding of the level of 
available coverage is incomplete. However, if the level of actual damage is so small, then the balance of 
investment and coverage would indicate an economic puzzle that deserves more research.  
 
Attackers’ Motivation 
An additional puzzle comes from a study exploring the menus of vulnerabilities in attackers’ malware kits, 
concluding that attackers are in fact, lazy.6 Owing to the costly effort in developing new tools, attackers 
persist with malware based on existing vulnerabilities, long after effective patches have been introduced to 
the market as opposed to exploiting new vulnerabilities in the system(s). Fixed costs appear to make 
attackers investment decisions as similarly “lumpy” (i.e., uncertain) as those surrounding the defense 
dilemma decisions of their corresponding targets.  
Another interesting facet of cyber attackers is their psychological profile and self-perception in terms of 
criminality, which affects software engineers’ decisions to deploy labor for legal productive efforts or those 
deemed illegal, such as taking control of vulnerable machines and then selling these ‘shells’ for 
exploitation of financial records or deploying them for large computational tasks to other criminals.. 
Attackers appear to be able to switch liberally between standard software engineering projects and those 
that would normally be deemed illegal. The criminology literature indicates that the profiles associated with 
a cyber attacker reveals a far lower persistence in offending type; hackers choose to do work they feel is 
optimal for their own welfare rather than identify themselves by the offending activity.7,8  
Although this is somewhat unhelpful for quantitative work, we can reasonably conjecture that the pool 
of threats that security industry faces is uncertain. If attackers fixed costs change, we could see a sudden 
and dramatic increase or decrease in attacking intensity, with little way to predict such shifts.  As discussed, 
because of a lack of robust historical data surrounding attackers and predicting their behavior, each 
observation might be the result of an equilibrium formed from a very different experiment. Identifying 
causal relationships directly from data is an inherently fraught process, and the lack of detailed 
understanding of the attacker production function compounds this problem (for more information, see the 
“Econometrics” sidebar). 
***sidebar goes here*** 
 
 
Externalities and Dependencies  
How do firms operational level (micro) security decisions aggregate to the macro and hence the public 
policy level? Aggregation brings certain benefits as idiosyncratic impacts from events on single firms even 
out. However, public policy mandates on security policy must be implemented at the micro level, and 
inappropriately onerous requirements could generate costs for the productive side of the economy that are 
potentially unwarranted and most certainly unfair. The cybersecurity literature is starting to demonstrate an 
emerging awareness that the ability to control both the risk-generating mechanism and the source of 
contingent compensation in the event of a breach can lead to onerous rents.9 Ranjan Pal and his colleagues 
illustrated this problem by devising a model in which a security vendor provides both a monopoly service 
and a monopoly provision of insurance, and the combined monopolies generate a substantial profit. 
However, the realization that the “substantial” profit from insurance and security activity is not globally 
desirable.  
In a network of firms, the provision of security has several dependencies, both indirect and direct (that 
is, through direct technical interconnections, such as shared data facilities and electronic communications 
networks for financial institutions). Direct connections have been studied extensively in the recent 
literature, whereas indirect connections are a more recent research interest. For a classic description of the 
interdependency problem in security, see “Interdependent Security,” and for a full network game with 
contagion, see Network Security and Contagion.10,11 
Indirect connections address the risk environment. This is the change in a firm’s risk profile due to the 
choices of other firms in the network—not through direct linkages but as a result of changes in the overall 
number and intensity of attackers as a result of their perceived returns on investment. The provision of 
public goods in networks has been the subject of significant interest in recent research.12,13 From a security 
perspective, it’s important that investment has a public good component in addition to the private benefits 
to the firm. 
A good is considered public if it is non-rival and non-excludable—that is, the good is enjoyed 
simultaneously by an unlimited number of consumers, and it is not possible to prevent others from gaining 
free access to the good. Note; that only aspects of security have a common property through the aggregate 
effect on attackers’ expected payoffs. Moreover, as our title suggests, it may be more appropriate to 
consider aspects of security to be closer to a common property good, that is the cost of exclusion in 
consumption of security investment is very high as opposed to impossible in the pure public good case.  
Taking the above forward, it seems that if I increase my effort in an activity and it has a positive 
spillover effect to you (e.g., I invest in more security and discourage a small amount of the aggregate 
number of attackers, thereby reducing my own risk), then all agents in my network engage in this virtuous 
cycle until a Nash equilibrium is reached. (Note: that this might not be as desirable as a coordinated action 
mediated by policymakers). However, consider the patching problem for network or client software. Many 
firms’ information platforms modular components are specialized and interconnected. Applying a patch in 
one system might have unintended consequences for other systems (e.g., if a vendor drops legacy support). 
As such, patches commonly need to be tested, particularly for critical systems. This means that applications 
of patches have fixed costs, and as we ramp up these fixed costs, the degree of patching coverage drops, 
and the firms in an economic network suffer through the interdependency in security as we forestall or 
neglect investments at critical points. This vulnerability does not stem from direct interconnections but via 
the attractiveness for attackers to invest in attacks that often have very little specific targeting other than a 
certain platform or a vulnerable library still in use with a legacy system. The attacked firm may not have 
been very profitable for the attacker, but their hit is the result of other more attractive prospects still being 
out there. Even though the attack may not have been particularly profitable to the attacker, the damage to 
the firm may still be quite severe. 
The “lumpy” investment profile is also reflected in the security interdependencies with other firms; 
more importantly, the lumpy profile of a large firm can be felt across the network either directly or 
indirectly. Indeed, this observation formed the basis of early research on the importance of liability sharing 
in security patch management.14 Hence, fixed costs appear to exaggerate already problematic issues of 
externalities, transmitting costs between firms, and form the basis of our conjecture that unpredictable 
investment generates excess aggregate security threats. If attackers can expect to make a good profit 
because somebody out there is unpatched, they will continue to invest time and effort in their current 
technology before switching to a new one. The important point is that the opportunity set and expected 
reward for attackers will be formed from the aggregation of all of the unpatched vulnerabilities, many of 
which will be the result of small delays in investment. Hence, there is potentially a feedback mechanism 
that is sustaining risks to firms beyond the process of new vulnerability discovery. 
Waiting to invest in cybersecurity may be deemed a poor risk management strategy, despite many standard 
models indicating that delaying investment until the nature of the uncertainty is clear is often the most 
appropriate course of action. A manager investing in cybersecurity infrastructure must determine the costs 
of inaction (which might be a function of accumulating risks) versus the cost of action (which might be 
fixed or have a random forward-looking component). These optimal control problems will likely depend on 
the joint decision making of all actors in a security context. This is in contrast to models of optimal 
decision making that treat a threat as a random external event in their environment (i.e., an emergent risk). 
Furthermore, if attackers have the same type investment decision making problem (upfront fixed 
investments and continuous variable costs), we might find that the adjustment path for the intensity of 
attacks on firms increases the unpredictability of associated risks. Ergo, small changes in regulatory policy 
could lead to substantial unexpected changes in the threat environment. 
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Sidebar 
Econometrics 
In econometrics, we often seek to identify exogenous and endogenous variables in a system of regression 
equations. By exogenous variables we refer to regressors that are uncorrelated with the noise term inherent 
in the regression. Endogenous variables exhibit some level of correlation with the noise term. For instance if 
an explanatory variable in one regression equation is an independent variable in another regression, it is an 
endogenous variable within the system of equations.  Several empirically driven approaches, such as the 
use of linear and nonlinear instrumental variable regressions, have been proposed to correct for the 
identification issues inherent in empirical models in which knowledge of the underlying process is not well 
understood. Evidence from a broad range of micro-econometric studies have illustrated that the exclusion of 
appropriate instrumental variables from empirical models can result in highly misleading inferences. See 
chapters 9 and 10 of Badi Baltagi’s book for a good summary of endogeneity, instruments and multiple 
equation modeling in regression analysis. 
 
 
Abstract: Cybersecurity tends to be viewed as a highly dynamic, continually evolving technology race 
between attacker and defender. However, economic theory suggests that in many cases doing “nothing” is 
the optimal strategy when substantial fixed adjustment costs are present. Indeed, the authors’ anecdotal 
experience as chief information security officers indicates that uncertain costs that might be incurred by 
rapid adoption of security updates substantially delay the application of recommended security controls, so 
the industry does appear to understand this economic aspect quite well. From a policy perspective, the 
inherently discontinuous adjustment path taken by firms can cause difficulties in determining the most 
effective public policy remit and the effectiveness of any enacted policies ex post. This article summarizes 
this type of policy issue in relation to the contemporary cybersecurity agenda.  
Keywords: Cybersecurity, return on security investment, fixed adjustment costs, real option value of 
delay, the public good aspect of security  
 
 
                                                          
i See the UN World Economic Situation and Prospects: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/. 
ii See the Gartner report link here http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2828722. 
 
